Plaintiff minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, appealed an order of dismissal from the Superior Court of Kern County (California), after defendant landlord’s motion for summary judgment was granted, in a complaint alleging causes of action for personal injury caused by motor vehicle, premises liability, general negligence and products liability.
The trial court granted defendant landlord’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff minor’s complaint alleging inter alia premises liability, general negligence and products liability. Plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently supervised its premises by allowing substantial numbers of children to be present without fencing or other structural confinement and, as a result thereof, the minor sustained injuries when he walked off the premises into a street and was struck by a vehicle. The california employment attorney helps you in all legal matters of Kern County.
The court found as a matter of law that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to provide fencing or some other means of confinement to the subject premises, thus plaintiff’s cause of action in negligence must fail. In the products liability action plaintiff contended the apartment house complex and grounds were defectively designed and constructed in that the complex was not fenced so as to prevent young residents of the complex from straying onto the street. The court concluded a complex of apartment dwellings, playground equipment and grounds did not constitute a product within the meaning and contemplation of strict products liability in tort law. The court affirmed.
The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant landlord on the grounds that defendant had no duty to plaintiff to provide fencing or some other means of confinement to the subject premises. As to plaintiff’s strict liability action, a complex of apartment dwellings, playground equipment and grounds did not constitute a product within the meaning and contemplation of strict products liability in tort law.
Appellants, an advocacy group and an individual, sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which denied their petition for writ of mandate alleging that respondents, a community college district and a joint labor/management benefits committee, had failed to comply with the public notice and open meeting requirements of the Ralph M. Brown Act, Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.
The district entered into a health benefits agreement with unions representing its employees. The agreement provided for the formation of a committee to review and to make recommendations regarding the health benefits offered by the district. The California Attorney General issued an opinion that the committee was not required to comply with the Brown Act. The court held that the committee was not a legislative body as defined in Gov. Code, § 54952, subd. (b), and thus was not required under Gov. Code, § 54953, subd. (a), to hold open meetings.
The committee had been created as part of, and for the purpose of furthering, the collective bargaining process under the Educational Employment Relations Act, Gov. Code, § 3540 et seq. Thus, the committee’s proceedings were exempt from the Brown Act as provided in Gov. Code, § 3549.1. Pursuant to Gov. Code, § 3543.3, the district, which was a public school employer as defined in Gov. Code, § 3540.1, subd. (k), was entitled to meet and negotiate, within the meaning of § 3540.1, subd. (h), through its agents or representatives, with its employees’ exclusive representatives. The Attorney General’s opinion was entitled to considerable weight.
The court affirmed the judgment.